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SPECIAL NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
. W$-84

The Chances of an frien

_ Communist Chinese Nuclear Explosion

NOTE: This is the estimate os approved a the
’ United States Intelliganes Board,
furher distribution will be se

. Submitted by the
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

Coneurred in by ihe
UTED STATES INTELLIGENCE SCARD

As Indicated overlent
26 August 1944

WQS

BE SACS SAAS

wontha, Oleerly the possibility of auch wm debcontion hetore the end of

this year cannot be rulnd out = the test may occur daring thin period. — ‘
Oo walanosy however, wa believe the 14 will nok oc ait denetine after

tha end of 1964.

Tissot

1. Gyechead photogeaphy of 6-9 August shows that ‘the petriowsly
musyect tectiity near Lop Now Jn dinkleng 20 alnowt certainly a tuslear
testing mite. ‘Develoyasnte at the facility include « ground scar foswtng
abort 60 pennant of & aitele 19,600 soot in diameter around a 325-toot
tomer (firet sem dn Apel 1984 photography), and york on bunkers near the
tover ant instrumontation wites at aygropeiate’ locatioua 4s tinterway, [|

a cubward appearance mad apparent rabe of cctruction
drdinate that the nite could be ready for tent 4a tvo uonthe ox #0.
The charactoriwtdes of the site suggest that it ta being prepared for both
tagestio and weapon effect eaperdisaenta,

2 Analysts of all erallable avidentn on fisnienabio mtarial pro«
duction in Ching inttouted -- though it does mob prove -~ that the Chinese
WIT) nob here wittiolent reterial for a test of w nuclear davicg in the
next fev nonthe, ‘the only Chives production reuetor dteubitted to date ss

the mall, afr-nooled resbtar ab Puotttou,
Coustruatton was continaing
Tiroughout the site, incinding doe faizly eubotenttel work around the
pulling which houses the seactot, Puotugraphy of Haxch 1964 tndienbed
that major constriction. at the site -- including service ras] |
cae tad additional, acuity yroviatens —~ bad opperently been
soopleted. tua we believe the resotor went nto operation possibly dn .
the letter parb of 1963 tut mare protably in early 1901. We eationte that,
even if no xajor cbotacles were encountered, it would take at Lesot 18
montha, and nore Likely tvo years, after tha sisting up of the Pso~tten
reactor ‘before a miglear device would be rosdy for testing, ‘Thus, if the
Pao-t'ou ronctor started operation no earlier than late, 1963 amt tf tt te:
Chins's cally operating production sancbo, the earliest powadhie dete
for tenting de aid-1965. ,

3. Tb da, of course, poesthle thet the Chines have encther. scares
of fimeionebin natertal, Bush a feciiity might hare been started with
Boviet 242 ou w rewiilt of tho 1057 Soviet-thiness afd agremnant, probably
svout tha some tisk as the Lanthon ganas: diftielon butliing, We wild
expect this resetor to te a fairly large water-cooled produstion renstor,

___ There are arena, pectioularly yarts of Seechwen, wich axe suitable for
such & resco and have soo bean glictographed. Since ti is duubitwl thet

| i

@ reactor of this type could have bean Dintebed tefone tha withixveval. of
Bevlet techptatans in 1960, dts completion wold beve depended on a native
Chinese effort, & diffioult tut not inpouadble tek. Gach m renctor might -
have atevtea operations in 1962 or 1963, thus mking available sufficient
Plutonton fox o test by the end of this yen

4, On the other bani wa have photographed mush of the anes arcu
virtuslly al2 locations viere A-E activity 1s ia |
[dana ataut nate of a2 Incations that might be grographically
wuliable for reenter wilted, Apart trom Pao-tio, 10 operating production
weactor or tactope separation plast bag bean found, Wo beets 2b wilikely --
thoigh clearly aot topowsible +. that such on cparnbing faclisty entebe.

5 Te de lec poeuthte thet the Chinese aay bave avguined fiiolonstle
roterial drow a ftoretgn source, Gps,

___ a eer i
dy the post they Bove trenuferred appracishle ancunts of veenoo-grode wstertal
bo the Chinese, Is the onrrent state of thelr relations with the Chinese, they

woul aliost corfoinly not turatah tesiousble. mstoriais to thon. |

6, Obviously, 44 de fucongruoum to icing « test eike to # abate of |
retdiness desoxibed in persgreph 1 without bering’ = davicr newly xeedy Tor
tenting. “Th wowld be teohnicedly umiesiveble to inated, much of the tustrumn-
tation move ‘than « tow vooks bitors the actual teat. We cannot tell, fron
available photography wiettta the inwhellations hve yet reached thin —
point «~ it seems unilibely that they have, cadnly became sos heavy coo-
wtruvtion do still going on. However, i¢ tn poorthie that tha beats work:

WHEL secu be completed, and that final preparations could be nude this fall.

T., On the other hand, in much « comilex undertaking as pdvahoed bs
venpons developaimt -~ esyentatly wien tt 49 almost certein that ther ie
boy politica! prassace foe at. laut none Tedulte -~ it woud nat be aur.
peiedug 4f thete vera uneven progress wecng various plawes of the progtem,
1H a minber of Sostances in the yam, Feiping has been unable to prevent --
ond hea seemed vidhing to tolerate =~ uneven develognint ty various .
important yeogran, Uniest, fav other yarts of those advanced weapeus program
we have already obsdrved this, Geis feuLitien wenn to be behind schedule -~
notably the ingomplate gasecue Aiffuston plat wt Lanchou; othece are

Javper end ore elaboreto then prowanh Chinese capabilities warrant ~~
for exoapla, the powrtble mutléer weapons complex near Koko Wor.

8. As for tho tost-aite ttwelt, Lop Mor 1s extremely remote, with
ree transportation ond cosomalestion facilities, and wo might expect to
see the Ciinese taking o long leattice in preparing this inatelation.
Thay have yelativaly tev pen with the neceasory setontifie ceapetaned and
ond they comot Me fuly coitident that unexpooted dlftieuttios willnot
eppenr,. ‘We believottba Chinese would do everything in thedr péster to
prevent a lest Rinsho hitch oo the tenting: fuodidty fron delpying, even
hetefly, Cidins'a edvent exaunicle "power,"

9, The evidence and armament veviewed sbove do nob permit o very
confident extinate of the chaices of a Chinese Comundiat nuclear detonntion
ie the ost fo months, early the porsitiiity of wach a detonation bifare
tha end of this year cannct be xulet Gut — the tent vey oocur during thie
perdot. Oc balaics, heaves, we polieve that. 26 will not occur util sian-
tites after the end of 19Gh.# ‘

S or China's Advonced Waspons Program," mcheduled
for Ontober 206%, vill sddreum 11 aspects of the Chinese proprad.

ALTERNATE COPY FOLLOWS

43. Special National Intelligence Estimate/1/
SNIE 13-4-64
Washington, August 26, 1964.

/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, NIE Files. Top Secret; Ruff/[codeword not
declassified|. According to a note on the cover sheet, it was submitted by the Director of

Central Intelligence and concurred in by the U.S. Intelligence Board on August 26. The
Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State
and Defense, AEC, and NSA participated in its preparation. All USIB members concurred,
except the FBJ Assistant Director who abstained because the subject was outside his

jurisdiction.

THE CHANCES OF AN IMMINENT COMMUNIST CHINESE NUCLEAR
EXPLOSION

The Problem

To assess the likelihood that the advanced stage of construction at a probable nuclear test
site in Western China indicates that the Chinese Communists will detonate their first
nuclear device in the next few months.

Conclusion

On the basis of new overhead photography, we are now convinced that the previously
suspect facility at Lop Nor in Western China is a nuclear test site which could be ready for
use in about two months. On the other hand the weight of available evidence indicates that
the Chinese will not have sufficient fissionable material for a test of a nuclear device in the
next few months. Thus, the evidence does not permit a very confident estimate of the
chances of a Chinese Communist nuclear detonation in the next few months. Clearly the
possibility of such a detonation before the end of this year cannot be ruled out--the test may
occur during this period. On balance, however, we believe that it will not occur until
sometime after the end of 1964.

Discussion

1. Overhead photography of 6-9 August shows that the previously suspect facility near Lop
Nor in Sinkiang is almost certainly a nuclear testing site. Developments at the facility
include a ground scar forming about 60 percent of a circle 19,600 feet in diameter around a
325-foot tower (first seen in April 1964 photograph), and work on bunkers near the tower
and instrumentation sites at appropriate locations is underway. [/-1/2 lines of source text
not declassified| the outward appearance and apparent rate of construction indicate that the
site could be ready for a test in two months or so. The characteristics of the site suggest that

it is being prepared for both diagnostic and weapon effect experiments.

2. Analysis of all available evidence on fissionable material production in China indicates--
though it does not prove--that the Chinese will not have sufficient material for a test of a
nuclear device in the next few months. The only Chinese production reactor identified to
date is the small, air-cooled reactor at Pao-t'ou. As of September 1963, [less than I line of
source text not declassified]. Construction was continuing throughout the site, including
some fairly substantial work around the building which houses the reactor. Photography of
March 1964 indicated that major construction at the site--including service roads, [/ess than
1 line of source text not declassified] and additional security provisions--had apparently
been completed. Thus we believe the reactor went into operation possibly in the latter part
of 1963 but more probably in early 1964. We estimate that, even if no major obstacles were
encountered, it would take at least 18 months, and more likely two years, after the starting
up of the Pao-t'ou reactor before a nuclear device would be ready for testing. Thus, if the
Pao-t'ou reactor started operation no earlier than late 1963 and if it is China's only operating
production reactor, the earliest possible date. for testing is mid-1965. :

3. It is, of course, possible that the Chinese have another source of fissionable material.
Such a facility might have been started with Soviet aid as a result of the 1957 Soviet-
Chinese aid agreement, probably about the same time as the Lanchou gaseous diffusion
building. We would expect this reactor to be a fairly large water-cooled production reactor.
There are areas, particularly parts of Szechwan, which are suitable for such a reactor and
have not been photographed. Since it is doubtful that a reactor of this type could have been
finished before the withdrawal of Soviet technicians in 1960, its completion would have
depended on a native Chinese effort, a difficult but not impossible task. Such a reactor
might have started operations in 1962 or 1963, thus making available sufficient plutonium
for a test by the end of this year.

4, On the other hand we have photographed much of the area around virtually all locations
where A-E activity is indicated [Jess than 1 line of source text not declassified] about half of
all locations that might be geographically suitable for reactor sites. Apart from Pao-t'ou, no
operating production reactor or isotope separation plant has been found. We believe it
unlikely--though clearly not impossible--that such an operating facility exists.

5. It is also possible that the Chinese may have acquired fissionable material from a foreign
source, [9 lines of source text not declassified]. As for the Soviets, we do not believe that in
the past they have transferred appreciable amounts of weapon-grade material to the
Chinese. In the current state of their relations with the Chinese, they would almost certainly
not furnish fissionable materials to them.

6. Obviously, it is incongruous to bring a test site to a state of readiness described in
paragraph 1 without having a device nearly ready for testing. It would be technically
undesirable to install much of the instrumentation more than a few weeks before the actual
test. We cannot tell from available photography whether the installations have yet reached
this point--it seems unlikely that they have, mainly because some heavy construction is still
going on. However, it is possible that the basic work will soon be completed, and that final
preparations could be made this fall.

7. On the other hand, in such a complex undertaking as advanced weapons development--
especially when it is almost certain that there is heavy political pressure for at least some
results--it would not be surprising if there were uneven progress among various phases of

the program. In a number of instances in the past, Peiping has been unable to prevent--and
has seemed willing to tolerate--uneven development in various important programs. Indeed,
in other parts of their advanced weapons program we have already observed this. Some
facilities seem to be behind schedule--notably the incomplete gaseous diffusion plant at
Lanchou; others are larger and more elaborate than present Chinese capabilities warrant--for
example, the possible nuclear weapons complex near Koko Nor.

8. As for the test site itself, Lop Nor is extremely remote, with poor transportation and
communication facilities, and we might expect to see the Chinese taking a long leadtime in
preparing this installation. They have relatively few men with the necessary scientific
competence and they cannot be fully confident that unexpected difficulties will not appear.
We believe the Chinese would do everything in their power to prevent a last minute hitch
on the testing facility from delaying, even briefly, China's advent as a nuclear "power."

9. The evidence and argument reviewed above do not permit a very confident estimate of
the chances of a Chinese Communist nuclear detonation in the next few months. Clearly the
possibility of such a detonation before the end of this year cannot be ruled out--the test may
occur during this period. On balance, however, we believe that it will not occur until
sometime after the end of 1964./2/

/2/{Footnote in the source text (1 line) not declassified.]|

SOURCE: Foreign Relations of the United States 1964-68, Vol. XXX, China